ON Mr. BROWN'S THREE ESSAYS ON THE Characteristicks.

Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian *Spring.* POPE.

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4.

PREFACE.

TO know and own our Friends, is not more expedient in private life, than promotive of any public intereſt, for which we are concerned; eſpecially ſince mankind are, and will be, ſo much ruled by the authority of Great Names. And it is certainly imprudent, to ſay no worſe, in ſome ſincere Advocates for chriſtianity, to reject the friendly advice and aſſiſtance of ſo maſterly a Writer as the late Lord Shaftſbury, *and to give Him up to the Deiſts, as a patron of infidelity. In many Others, who have alſo given the ſame unfair and invidious repreſentation of his Lordſhip, this conduct is by no means impolitic and ill-judged: ſince they have had other views than that of promoting true chriſtianity, which are juſtly expoſed by his Lordſhip with a peculiar Elegance of raillery and ſtrength of Reaſoning: Hence the antipathy and prejudice, which they have conceived, and ſo induſtriouſly propagated againſt*

againſt his free writings. But whatever may be expected from the miſapprehenſion of the ignorant, and the ever-watchful jealouſy of Thoſe, who find it their intereſt to encourage the ſuperſtitious and ſlaviſh principles of the Vulgar: there yet are ſome hearty and judicious Wellwiſhers to our holy Religion, who, the Author hopes, will not be offended with an attempt to illuſtrate ſeveral important points of his Lordſhip's philoſophy, and fairly to repreſent His ſentiments concerning natural and revealed religion, in the following Animadverſions *on Mr.* Brown's Eſſays: *which will fully anſwer his intention, if they induce his Readers, either to give the* Characteriſticks *a fair, impartial, and intire peruſal, or to forbear their cenſures of the Noble Author.*

Ani-

Animadverſions

UPON

Mr. BROWN'S THREE ESSAYS, &c.

ANIMADVERSIONS *upon* ESSAY I.

On RIDICULE.

SECT. I. MR. *Brown*, having in his introduction raiſed our hopes of his impartiality and candour, by inculcating the 'generous ſpirit of freedom, which ſhines throughout the Characteriſticks;' proceeds to obſerve in his 6th page, 'That his Author, not content with eſtabliſhing the free, chearful exerciſe of reaſon in treating the ſubjects of Religion and Morals, revolts from his principles; and attempts to eſtabliſh the teſt of ridicule, as a ſurer method of conviction.' Hereby he intimates, that his Author ſets the teſt of ridicule in oppoſition to that of reaſon, in order to ſuperſede the latter. How juſt his Criticiſm is, will appear from the following paſſages in V. 1. p. 69, 77. "We ſhall grow better reaſoners by reaſoning pleaſantly and at our eaſe.——'Tis "the

" the habit alone of reaſoning, that can make a " reaſoner. And men can never be better in- " vited to the habit, than when they find plea- " ſure in it; uſing a freedom of raillery, a liberty " in decent language to queſtion every thing, " and an allowance of unravelling or refuting " any argument." Which is a full definition of that wit and humour, which the noble Author recommends, and ſhews him to have a ſufficiently preciſe and determinate Meaning. See p. 7 and 9.

Sect. II. In this ſection our Critic remarks upon his Author's abhorrence of pedantry; but the pedantry he abhors, is not the reaſoning clearly and diſtinctly upon a ſubject; but the authoritative air and bigotry of thoſe, who love to reign and be dictators in a point of controverſy, and a blind and ſtiff adherence to received opinions: and it is in oppoſition to this deciſive and peremptory dogmaticalneſs, and not to ſtrict reaſoning, that he expreſsly recommends the more free, polite and chearful method of wit and humour: which our Critic himſelf, in confirmation of his Author's ſentiment, prefers to the moroſe and ſurly ſpirit of bigotry. (p. 5.) And this method is of uſe in diſgracing known falſehood; in detecting falſehood, and laſtly of courſe in inveſtigating unknown truth: (p. 6) For to ſee Error expoſed is one Step to true Wiſdom.

In p. 9. Our Critic cenſures his Author for indulging a looſe and random wit; but I rather incline

incline to the opinion, he delivers in p. 11; where he well obſerves, that none ever knew the value of order and proportion better than Lord *Shaftſbury*, and that confuſion can only tend to diſgrace truth and diſguiſe falſehood.

SECT. III. In this ſection he thinks he has thoroughly explained his ſubject; but to uſe his own alluſion, p. 41. while he attempts to give us a full view of a ſpacious Dome, he ſeems to have thrown many of the exterior parts of the edifice into the center. For ſo exuberant is his fancy, that his learned obſervations are for the moſt part quite foreign to his ſubject; and ſuch is his good-nature and inoffenſiveneſs, that the reſt may be admitted without prejudice to his Author.

It is obſervable, that our Critic, having given merely arbitrary definitions of eloquence and argument in p. 29; 'the former, ſays he, offering apparent truth to the imagination, and the 'latter real truth to the underſtanding:' infers from hence, 'That to inſtruction or inquiry 'every ſpecies of eloquence muſt for ever be an 'enemy.' But in p. 37, he ſays, 'That ſpecies 'of eloquence is the nobleſt, which tends to 'conduct us to the ſame point with reaſon,' that is, to Truth. 'Tis clear, that eloquence may be employed in the ſervice or diſſervice of truth; which is alſo true of raillery and ſcepticiſm. For as his Lordſhip obſerves, "if it be "contrary to good breeding, it will in this re- "ſpect be contrary to liberty," and by conſequence

quence prejudicial to truth; and, There is nothing so fooliſh and deluding as " a partial ſcep-
" ticiſm." " But if it be under prudent ma-
" nagement, Religion will never be endangered
" by it:" or to uſe the Critic's own words in p. 47, ' it will be that ſpecies of ridicule which
' conducts us to the ſame point with reaſon.' Altho' indeed, a little before, he declares it to be ever an enemy to ſpeculative inſtruction or inquiry.

SECT. V. He elaborately ſhews, how ignorant and inconſiſtent mankind often are in the uſe and application of ridicule, in order to make out his Concluſion, ' that the reaſoning faculty
' and not ridicule is the teſt of truth;' which ſtrongly concludes in favour of his Author. For his Lordſhip cautions " againſt an extream
" in ridicule, and recommends the way of wit
" and humour by this argument, that reaſon
" may have its proof and be diſtinguiſhed."

SECT. VI. Our Critic here cenſures his Author's, as he calls it, ambiguous aſſertion, " That
" nothing is ridiculous except what is de-
" formed;" and yet confirms his meaning in it by juſtly obſerving in p. 55, 6, 7. ' That what
' actually appears ridiculous, firſt appears de-
' formed; and that real bravery, and generoſity,
' if they are not diſguiſed but retain their na-
' tive appearance, cannot be turned into ridi-
' cule: and that the virtues are admired, unleſs
' by miſrepreſentation they be made to ſtart up

' in

' in the forms of ideots, hags, and monſters.' In which caſe it is plain, that theſe ſilly appearances, and not the real form of virtue, are ridiculous. To ſay that virtue may be made ridiculous, becauſe it may be miſrepreſented, is like ſaying that the wiſeſt propoſition is falſe, becauſe it may be miſconſtrued.

To ſhew the invincible power of truth, where learning and freedom prevail, the noble Author inſtances in *Socrates*; whoſe doctrine ſupported itſelf againſt the wit of *Ariſtophanes:* our Critic wonders, expatiates boldly, and concludes his remarks with an air of triumph, boaſting to have ſilenced his Author's admirers; which he really has done, for how ſhould they make a reply, when they find no objection? For indeed, Mr. *Brown!* you have not even contradicted your Author. Whatever miſchief the blaſphemous Comedian might do to the perſon of *Socrates*, he gave no let to the progreſs of his divine philoſophy. This is a Truth evident from fact, which you have not once denied; and is all that your Author affirms in the paſſage, you cenſure as encouraging ' diſhoneſt ridicule' in p. 63.

SECT. VII. He objects againſt his Author's remark, *viz.* Truth may bear all lights, That it cannot bear a falſe one. Does his Lordſhip ſay, it can? Is there no variety of true lights, no different ways of repreſenting things truly? Or does He propoſe a falſe medium in that of

ridicule? Let his definition anſwer. " Ridi-
" cule is that method of proof, by which we
" diſcern whatever is liable to *juſt* raillery on
" any ſubject." V. 1. p. 61. This ſenſe of the word his Lordſhip always adheres to; and not one inſtance has been produced by Mr. *Brown*, who charges his Author with confuſion and ambiguous language; nor can one be produced, in which he deſigns it to convey any other meaning. And in recommending the uſe of this ridicule, which implies " juſtneſs of thought;" how can his Lordſhip be ſuppoſed to exclude reaſon and to recommend an half-inquiry, than which, he obſerves, there is nothing more fooliſh and deluding. And what ſenſe is there in that capital objection of Mr. *Brown*'s, viz. That his Lordſhip makes ridicule (which is conducted with juſtneſs of thought) the teſt of what is rational, inſtead of making reaſon the teſt of what is ridiculous?

All the remaining objections, which our Critic advances in this ſection, depend upon ſuppoſing his Author to maintain the following notions; *viz.* That a man may have juſtneſs of thought, and be miſtaken at once in the ſame thing; p. 65. that the uſe of ridicule is inconſiſtent with that of reaſon, that the way of gravity may be falſe and be abuſed to ill purpoſes, but ridicule cannot; p. 67, 8. that impoſture not only generally but conſtantly aſſumes an air of gravity, but never that of buffoonery and falſe humour; p. 69. that the ridicule he means

to

to recommend, is inconſiſtent with chearfulneſs and good-humour, and in ſhort an embroiler and incendiary. p. 70. and, laſtly, that abuſed ridicule is one of the leaſt powerful engines, by which Error can be maintained and eſtabliſhed; p. 74. But his Author has delivered perfectly the reverſe of all theſe abſurdities: which are only 'the ideots, hags, and monſters, that have 'odly ſtarted up' in the imagination of our Critic, and aſſumed the name of Lord *Shaftſbury*'s ſentiments; and no wonder, if he cannot touch his Author, while he thus purſues a lying Phantom.

Inſtat cui Turnus. See p. 10.

SECT. VIII. Our Critic in p. 76, calls upon his Lordſhip's followers to get him off as they can: but I ſee no difficulty in the paſſages he quotes, and I am ſure he points out none. He indeed queſtions, whether his Lordſhip was a believer and a proteſtant; and that without aſſigning the leaſt reaſon of his ſuſpicion.

(Where is now your profeſſed candour and impartiality, Mr. *Brown!*

Naturam expellas furca, tamen uſque recurret.)

Then having given us a conjecture or two of his Lordſhip's, he breaks out into a vehement exclamation, and calmly concludes with annexing in ſolemn phraſe the ſanction of his own

judgment and authority to thoſe very ſentiments, which we find in the paſſages, he quotes and cenſures. For he obſerves with his Lordſhip, 'That Chriſtianity had more to fear from the 'contemptuous miſrepreſentations than the bit-'tereſt rage of its enemies, *&c.*' p. 80.

I am ſorry that our Critic ſeems not to underſtand his Author's deſign in theſe paſſages; which was to recommend the way of ridicule, the chearful and facetious exerciſe of reaſon, as a preſervative from the gloom of ſuperſtition and the extravagances of enthuſiaſm: which naturally leads him to this obſervation, That raillery is the ſevereſt teſt of any doctrine.

SECT. IX. Our Critic, as we have ſeen, repreſents his Author as contending for a certain irrational ridicule: and in this ſection he declares his conſent with that ſuppoſed opinion of his Lordſhip, *viz.* that all raillery excludes reaſoning; and forcibly preſſeth *Ariſtotle* into his ſervice (by what I am ſorry to mention, conſidering the true pains he has taken, in this ſingle point, to diſplay his grammatical ſkill and familiarity with that Philoſopher's ſtile and ſentiment;) by a miſtaken tranſlation either of σπουδη or γελως, in the following Paſſage ——

—— δει την μεν σπουδην διαφθειρειν των ενανλιων γελωλι, τον δε γελωλα σπουδη·

His Tranſlation is, you ought to confound your

your adverſary's ſerious argument by raillery, and his raillery by ſerious argument.

Pray, Mr. *Brown!* why ought not γελως to be rendered humorous argument, as well as σπουδη ſerious argument? Have not thoſe words, in their ſtrict ſignification, an equal claim and right to include argument? Why then are you ſo arbitrary and partial in favour of σπουδη? Why truly to ſhew that *Ariſtotle* thought, more than he has expreſſed, that reaſon can be grave, but never humorous.

His Lordſhip's conſtruction of the words into gravity and humour, is accurately juſt: and if humour is of uſe in eloquence in general, it is ſo in 'that ſpecies of eloquence, which con-'ducts to the ſame point with reaſon,' that is, to truth: and by conſequence it is of uſe in ſpeculative inquiries after truth. It is with propriety then, that his Lordſhip improves this particular precept of the Great Critic upon Eloquence, into that general rule for helping our ſpeculations, which is contained in this maxim: Humour is the only teſt of gravity; and gravity, of humour. * Uſe the grave method of reaſoning,

* Mr. *Brown*, it ſeems, cannot be reconciled to this compendious manner of expreſſion, which is common in aphoriſms or proverbial maxims. I ſhall therefore obſerve by way of illuſtration, that the different ways of reaſoning, *viz.* gravity and humour, like the algebraical and geometrical ways of demonſtrating a propoſition, may with ſtrict pro-

ing, as a teſt of the humorous, becauſe a jeſt that will not bear a ſerious examination, is certainly falſe wit. And try the grave way, by the humorous; becauſe a ſerious argument, that is liable to juſt raillery, is falſe. But be honeſt and ſteady to the cauſe of truth; and keep that in your aim conſtantly in the uſe of both methods. Beware of ſinking into a too deep thoughtfulneſs, in which the mind is apt to loſe itſelf; and check that natural propenſity towards veneration and aſtoniſhment, which, with its uſual concomitant, implicit ſubmiſſion to authority, often reſtrains men from a rational inquiry, and lays them under the chains of ignorance and ſlaviſh zeal.

On the other hand, be cautious of a ſilly affectation and immoderate love of wit; and ſuffer not yourſelf to be diverted from your principal aim by any pleaſant images and ludicrous ſcenes of fancy, that may happen to preſent themſelves.

By theſe and other precepts of equal importance, the noble Author teaches us to chaſtiſe our paſſions, even thoſe, which naturally whet our appetite for knowledge; and with caution to indulge one paſſion, as that of humour, when we

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propriety be termed the mutual teſt of each other. For if both be true, they mutually confirm each other; if only one be true, it will refute the other; and if both be falſe and inconſiſtent, they will probably by their claſhing, as it were, ſtrike fire, and caſt light upon a ſubject.

we are in danger of exceeding in a contrary one, as grave admiration or myſterious enthuſiaſm: that ſo they may be all ſubſervient to the improvement of our minds; and while they ſtimulate our reaſon, may yet by a due counterpoiſe preſerve it free and eaſy in its exerciſes.

But his Lordſhip has not only taught us by his precepts, how to apply humour to the ſearch of truth. But what is by much the moſt agreeable and improving way of inſtruction, he has favoured us in his Eſſay with a ſpecimen of that humorous kind of writing, which he means to recommend. And whoever reads it in an accurate and ſtudious manner, will not find his humour to be, (as Mr. *Brown* repreſents it) a light, trifling, and ſuperficial wit; which diverts itſelf with unmeaning jokes and ambiguous innuendos: but will be pleaſed to ſee, how chaſte it is, how happily tempered with gravity in treating the moſt important ſubjects, and how ſucceſsfully it is employed in defence of liberty, honeſty, and religion.

ANIMADVERSIONS *upon Mr.* Brown's THREE ESSAYS *on the* CHARACTERISTICKS.

ANIMADVERSIONS *upon* ESSAY II.

On the obligations of man to virtue, and the neceſſity of religious principles.

SECT. II. OUR Critic juſtly obſerves, that the noble Author's definition of virtue conveys the ſame idea, that the word itſelf generally does; which is an argument of the propriety of the definition, eſpecially if his Lordſhip has before explained its terms. But the term, *moral objects of right and wrong*, he has before explained; and means by it, all thoſe qualities, which come under the cogniſance and cenſure of that faculty in the mind of man, which is called conſcience, or moral taſte, or moral ſenſe. Whoever has this faculty, cannot but underſtand the term; and he, that has it not, can never be made to underſtand it by all the definitions in the world. And his Lordſhip has alſo, with equal accuracy and judgment, prepared his attentive reader for the uſe of the other terms in his definition, *viz. a juſt diſpoſition or proportionable affection* of a rational crea-

creature towards theſe objects. The diſpoſition or affection towards any moral objects is plainly then juſt in kind, when it is that of love or averſion, which they juſtly deſerve; and proportionable in degree, when that love or averſion has its due ſhare of influence; fortifying the agent againſt all difficulties and temptations, and inclining him to do nothing inconſiſtent with that diſpoſition, which is due to other moral objects of higher moment.

If our candid reader ſhould imagine any difficulty or intricacy in the laſt clauſe of our explication; he will find it entirely cleared up, by an attentive peruſal of what Lord *Shaftſbury* offers by way of preliminary to his definition. He may perhaps of himſelf ſee, that there may ſometimes happen a competition not only betwixt the plain inſtances of virtue and vice; but alſo betwixt the particular inſtances of duty or virtue, that may invite the agent to different actions at the ſame time. Thus, to uſe Mr. *Brown*'s inſtance in p. 134, a parent may be moved or tempted by a ſenſe of the duty he owes his child, to one courſe of action; and at the ſame time, by a ſenſe of the duty he owes the public, to a different courſe. In which caſe, the conſcientious parent will inquire, in which of theſe duties the prepollency of obligation lies; and finding it to lie in the regard he owes his country, he will be determined by this motive; convinced that upon a compariſon parental duty in this inſtance is not binding, and

that his natural tenderneſs would have been immoderate and criminal, if it had induced him to violate the higher obligation of a public ſpirit. This, I hope, is ſufficient to ſhew the full meaning and judiciouſneſs of his Lordſhip's definition; which is at once a moſt comprehenſive and exact one; and affords us a juſt criterion or teſt, by which to determine the merit of actions, *viz.* Whether they flow from a juſt diſpoſition, *&c.* See p. 117.

I beg leave to obſerve, that to diſcover with perfect preciſion and certainty the merit or demerit, and the degree of each in the actions of men, is difficult, if not impoſſible, for us: becauſe we can ſeldom, if ever, ſee all the real ſprings or motives of acting, the exact meaſure of reaſon and knowledge they have, the peculiar relations and obligations, which each man finds in his own ſphere of life, and many other circumſtances. But if any fact be fairly repreſented to the mind of man, with all the circumſtances that any way affect the moral nature of it, he would then by the power of conſcience, form a juſt and exact determination concerning the merit of the fact; his conſcience would naturally incline him to uſe the method, which his Lordſhip has pointed out in his definition; and to inquire, whether or no the action flowed from a juſt diſpoſition, *&c.*

Sect. III. Mr. *Brown*'s ſuppoſed fact of a man's talking deſignedly to a poſt, or to a man in

in an unknown tongue; does not properly come under the cogniſance of conſcience; but under that of reaſon, which pronounces it madneſs.

In his 129 p. and elſewhere, He repreſents Lord *Shaftſbury* as maintaining an original, independent moral beauty of action, without taking into conſideration the tendencies, ends and conſequences of action. Surely he has never read the firſt book of the Inquiry, in which his Lordſhip has ſhewn, that the moral character of actions depends upon the temper and affections, whence they proceed: which plainly implies a regard to the intended or probable conſequences of ſuch actions. When his Lordſhip, immediately after making mention of faſhion, law, cuſtom and religion, aſſerts the independent nature of worth and virtue; how can it be imagined that he aſſerts the moral quality of actions to be independent upon their ends and conſequences?

Mr. *Brown* has thrown an ambiguity into the queſtion concerning the quality of actions, for want of making a neceſſary diſtinction betwixt a philoſophical and a political inquiry on this ſubject; the reſult of which may be ſometimes quite contrary. A politician will determine an action to be right or wrong according to the good or bad influence, he thinks it has, upon the public: but the philoſopher, whoſe buſineſs it is to aſcertain the merit of the agent in that action, will conſider the probable views and in-

tentions, knowledge and temper of the agent; and may therefore paſs a different judgment of it. And while he eſtabliſhes 'The principle '(as he calls it) of univerſal happineſs as the 'laſt criterion or teſt, to which the moral 'beauty, truth or rectitude of our affections is 'to be referred:' it would become him to conſider, how much divided mankind are in their opinions concerning the means of promoting univerſal happineſs, and even of, what we mortals call, the public good; and that notwithſtanding his 'one uniform circumſtance of pub-'lic happineſs,' which he preſcribes as an infallible remedy for all doubts and difficulties on this ſubject; yet till he has fixed another criterion, by which we may certainly know the public conſequences of actions, we ſhall be forced to judge by no other than the deſpicable rule of fancy and opinion. See p. 140. I might purſue this reflection, were I not afraid of being ſuſpected of fondly attempting to diſturb our Critic's high ſatisfaction, by undermining his plain hypotheſis. But I decline ſuch an unfriendly part: and for the future ſhall leave him to the enjoyment of his own imaginations and expreſſions, and confine myſelf to the examination of his cenſures of the noble Author.

Sect. IV. He cenſures him in this ſection for laying a precarious foundation, and betraying the cauſe, of virtue. The charge I underſtand; but the reaſon of it, which he immediately

diately prefixes, is to me unintelligible, if it be not the ſame ſentiment with that in his 129 p. which we have conſidered.

SECT. V. This ſection is conſecrated to the witty, but unphiloſophical Dr. *Mandeville*.

SECT. VI. Mr. *Brown* in his 159 p. affirms, that his Author has not ſhewn our obligation to virtue by any particular argument; whereas he has elaborately proved it in his inquiry by theſe arguments, *viz.* That every man is under the obligation of conſcience, or the moral ſenſe, to act virtuouſly; that the general conſtitution of the mind of man makes the enjoyment of virtuous diſpoſitions neceſſary to his happineſs; and that the practice of our duty is, in the main at leaſt, favourable to our external intereſt: or, to ſum up the whole in his Lordſhip's own words, " that virtue is the good and vice the ill of " every one.

I ſhall here obſerve that he often throws a cloud over his Author's meaning, by repreſenting many of his profeſſed ſentiments and arguments, as if they were only accidental obſervations or forced conceſſions. For example, in p. 134. he ſays the noble Writer hath allowed, if kindneſs or love of the moſt natural ſort be immoderate, it is undoubtedly vicious: which is one of his Lordſhip's arguments to prove the neceſſity of a due balance in the affections. And in p. 165, he calls this a conceſſion alſo, that he

he affirms the perception of moral excellence to be as really pleaſant and delightful, as the perception of natural beauty, order, and harmony. *

Sect. VII. He cenſures Him for affirming, that the uniform exerciſe of the public affections is the only ſource of happineſs to every individual; and that the private affections are by no means a foundation for private happineſs: this extravagance he condemns, as if his Author meant to exclude the meaner gratifications of life entirely out of the happineſs of the virtuous. Whereas, among other arguments in favour of virtue, his Lordſhip inſiſts largely in his inquiry on its happy efficacy in reſpect of inferior enjoyments. And this argument he himſelf takes notice of; but according to his uſual artifice calls it a conceſſion.

He gives us, in p. 179, a quotation from his Author, which, he ſays, ſeems to imply, that the moſt obdurate endeavours, to get rid of the force of moral beauty, are ineffectual and vain: which is directly contrary to the true meaning of the paſſage, *viz.* That if the beauty of virtue does not charm and attract us, ſome inferior and falſe beauty will, as that of grandeur, titles, honours, *&c.*

In

* The ſame unfairneſs Mr. *Brown* hath ſhewn towards ſeveral Authors, whom he mentions occaſionally: particularly towards the ingenious Author of *The Pleaſures of Imagination*, a Poem. See p. 99.

In his 184 p. he quotes part of an admirable paſſage in the Eſſay on wit and humour; the deſign of which is, to inculcate an uniform adherence to virtue from this conſideration, that the miſery and vexation, that attends an inconſiſtency of conduct, and fluctuating betwixt virtue and vice, is greater than even that, which attends a perverſe and thorough wickedneſs. This Mr. *Brown* produces as a confirmation of his own aſſertion, 'that where the ſelfiſh or 'malevolent affections prevail, there can be no 'internal motive or natural obligation to virtue.' Excellent reaſoning in truth! He quotes alſo a chapter in *Arrian* † for the ſame purpoſe, the ſubſtance of which is this prudential caution.

Be not like children; who are fond of every novelty, and are eaſily diverted from any purſuit, when a new object accoſts their fancy. If they ſee a play acted they are for being actors: if they hear fiddlers, they want a fiddle; and if they ſee a company of ſoldiers, they are all for military accoutrements and fighting. Be not you ſuch apes: fix one plan of life; but count the coſt, reckon upon all the difficulties of it, take an exact account of the good and evil immediately attending and conſequent upon it; draw the balance, and if after ſo mature a deliberation you are ſatisfied with the plan, purſue it

† *Nonne acriores morſus ſunt intermiſſæ libertatis, quam retentæ? Civilis certe ſunt acriores, eamque ob cauſam ſunt moralis.*

it ſteadily with all your ſoul and might: that ſo there may be a ſymphony, a conſonance and uniformity in all your actions. Think not to be good and bad by turns, and religious only upon occaſion. ‖ Mr. *Brown!* pray read the original again, and ſay, Whether you ſtill think, that the ancients were of the ſame opinion with ſome modern philoſophers; and counted it a matter of indifference to the happineſs of mankind, whether they be conſiſtent in virtue or vice?

SECT. VIII. He condemns the noble Author for maintaining the all-ſufficiency of conſcience, or the moral ſenſe, in all men to induce them to the conſtant practice of virtue. But on the contrary he often pathetically * laments the inſufficiency and defect of that moral principle; and therefore corroborates and ſtrengthens the more refined arguments to goodneſs by inferior and leſs honourable motives. He indeed ſuppoſes all men to have a capacity of virtue; and if they have not, Mr. *Brown!* not all the arguments and motives you can poſſibly invent, nor the higheſt promiſes of happineſs both in this and a future world, can ever give them that capacity, or make them virtuous in the leaſt.

SECT.

‖ *Arr.* Lib. 3. C. 15. ινα σι δει ανθρωπον ειναι, η αγαθον η κακον. Compare with *Rev.* Ch. 3. v. 15. I would thou wert cold or hot, that is, Declare ſincerely and entirely for virtue or vice.

* *E. G.* In a paſſage which Mr. *Brown* quotes in his next ſection.

SECT. IX. In this ſection he charges his Lordſhip with decrying the hope of future reward, as unworthy of a man, as miſerable, vile, and mercenary. Whereas his Lordſhip's repreſentation of the ſubject is really this: The merit of acting from the hope of future reward, depends upon the notion we have of that reward. For example, if our hope be that of a *Mahometan* paradiſe, it will naturally cheriſh thoſe ſenſual propenſities, which alone it promiſes to gratify; and ſo may be in danger of infecting the temper. But if our hope be of ſuch an happy kind, as to include " the love and deſire of virtuous " enjoyment, * it is not derogatory to " virtue:" which his Lordſhip expreſsly aſſerts in Mr. *Brown*'s quotation in p. 216. But of this more in our 35 p.

I ſhall only add under this ſection this quære, relating to Mr. *Brown*'s 211 p. Take away adoration and gratitude to the Supream Being, and the other parts of devotion, which are neceſſarily included in them,

* That is, ſuch enjoyment as cannot be reliſhed without a virtuous diſpoſition: which, I hope, the reader has a better taſte than to think, as our Critic thinks it, an unintelligible refinement.

out of religion; and what remains of nobleneſs and dignity will there be in religion?

Sect. X. This ſection contains an heavy charge againſt the noble Author, namely, that he throws an odium on that method of religious diſcipline, called catechiſing. But the catechiſing his Lordſhip diſapproves, is expreſsly that, which inſtils metaphyſical points of faith into tender minds: and he plainly recommends a method of inſtruction, namely, ſuch as may teach young perſons the knowledge of themſelves, the great end of their being, and wherein their ſupream felicity doth naturally conſiſt; and ſuch, in ſhort, as may teach them the moſt uſeful doctrines, (not by rote merely, but) in the moſt uſeful manner, by giving them an inſight into the reaſons and kind deſign and excellence of thoſe ſummary precepts and divine laws; which ought to determine them in their conduct, and be the leading principles of their lives. And this, the reader will eaſily ſee, is implied in the detached paſſage, even as it ſtands in Mr. *Brown*'s quotation, in p. 230: which compare with our 53 page.

But I am weary of the trifling remarks, which

which my ſubject has forced me to; and want to relieve myſelf and reader from this inſipid and diſagreeable taſk: which I cannot better do, than by tranſcribing what follows:

—— " Though the appearing diſorders in " the preſent courſe of things, hold ever ſo " ſtrongly againſt virtue, and in favour of " vice, the objection, which ariſes hence " againſt a Deity, may be eaſily removed, " and ſet right again on the ſuppoſal of a " future ſtate. This to a chriſtian, or one " already convinced of ſo great a point, is " ſufficient to clear every dark cloud of " providence. For he needs not be over-" and-above ſollicitous as to the fate of " virtue in this world, who is ſecure of " Hereafter. But the caſe is otherwiſe as to " the people we are here to encounter. " They are at a loſs for providence, and " ſeek to find it in the world. The ag-" gravation of the appearing diſorders in " worldly affairs, and the blackeſt repreſen-" tation of ſociety and human nature, will " hardly help 'em to this view. 'Twill be " difficult for 'em to read providence in " ſuch characters. From ſo uncomely a " face of things below, they will preſume " to think unfavourably of all above. By " the effects they ſee, they will be inclined

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" to judge the cauſe, and by the fate of vir-
" tue to determine of a providence. But
" being once convinced of order and a pro-
" vidence, as to things preſent, they may
" ſoon perhaps be ſatisfied even of a future
" ſtate. For if virtue be to itſelf no ſmall
" reward, and vice in a great meaſure its
" own puniſhment; we have a ſolid ground
" to go upon. The plain foundations of a
" diſtributive juſtice, and due order in this
" world, may lead us to conceive a further
" building. We apprehend a larger ſcheme,
" and eaſily reſolve ourſelves, why things
" were not compleated in this State; but
" their accompliſhment reſerv'd rather to
" ſome further period. For had the good
" and virtuous of mankind been wholly
" proſperous in this life; had goodneſs never
" met with oppoſition, nor merit ever lain
" under a cloud; where had been the tri-
" al, victory, or crown of virtue? Where
" had the virtues had their theatre, or
" whence their names? Where had been
" temperance or ſelf-denial? Where pa-
" tience, meekneſs, magnanimity? Whence
" have theſe their being? What merit, ex-
" cept from hardſhip? What virtue with-
" out a conflict, and the encounter of ſuch
" enemies as ariſe both within, and from
" abroad?

" But

" But as many as are the difficulties " which virtue has to encounter in this " world, her force is yet ſuperior. Expos'd " as ſhe is here, ſhe is not however aban- " don'd or left miſerable. She has enough " to raiſe her above pity, tho' not above our " wiſhes: and as happy as we ſee her here, " we have room for further hopes in her " behalf. Her preſent portion is ſufficient " to ſhew providence already ingaged on her " ſide. And ſince there is ſuch proviſion " for her Here, ſuch happineſs and ſuch ad- " vantages even in this life; how probable " muſt it appear, that this providential care " is extended yet further to a ſucceeding " life, and perfect Hereafter!"

See Ch. V. 2. P. 275, 6. For theſe, kind Reader! are indeed the words of That Author; who, according to Mr. *Brown*'s cenſure, ' teaches only a viſionary, irrational, ' and dangerous Philoſophy; who decries the ' proſpect of future happineſs and miſery, ' as an uſeleſs principle; who attempts to ' ridicule and diſhonour religion in every ' ſhape, and denies it to have any good in- ' fluence upon men.'

ANI-

ANIMADVERSIONS *upon Mr.* Brown's ESSAYS *on the* CHARACTERISTICKS.

ANIMADVERSIONS *upon* ESSAY III.

On revealed religion and Chriſtianity.

SECT. I. HIS firſt ſection is ſo full of pure invective, that it offers not the leaſt argument to our animadverſion. I ſhall only obſerve upon the confuſed repreſentation; which in his 243 p. he has given us of the noble Author's ſentiments; that his Lordſhip is not ſpeaking of Chriſtianity, when he is expreſſing his entire condeſcenſion to his ſuperiors: as Mr. *Brown* intimates. For the connection and references plainly ſhew, that his Lordſhip is there ſpeaking of ſuch doctrines, as were ſupported by pretences only to miracles and inſpiration, and of thoſe holy rites, thoſe diſtinguiſhing tenets and myſterious points of faith, which are by law eſtabliſhed, and have

have the ſanction of ancient councils; the temper and authority of which (He ſays) may be judged of by that of later ſynods and modern convocations. See Vol. 3. p. 70, 71. and the paſſages there referred to: where notwithſtanding Mr. *Brown*'s cenſure of his Author's broken hints and ambiguous expreſſions, He clearly and fully delivers his ſentiments upon theſe ſubjects; and in ſuch a way too, as is perfectly conſiſtent both with a decent regard to the civil Authority, and the explicit declaration, which at other times he makes, in favour of Revelation.

His Lordſhip ſays of himſelf, in Vol. 3. p. 70. " that he is as little a ſceptic in the " vulgar ſenſe of that word, as he is *Epicu-* " *rean* or atheiſt. And again, As to what " relates to revelation in general, he profeſ- " ſes to believe, as far as is poſſible for " any one, who himſelf had never experi- " enced any divine communication, whether " by dream, viſion, apparition or other ſu- " pernatural operation; nor was ever preſent " as eye-witneſs of any ſign, prodigy, or " miracle whatſoever. And in Vol. 2. " p. 330. Chriſtians have a far better and " truer revelation (than the Heathens or " Jews) They have plainer oracles, a more " rational law and clearer ſcripture, carrying its

" its own force, and withal ſo well atteſted
" as to admit of no diſpute. And further,
" The * exact time, when miracles might
" have ceaſed, probably was, when Sacred
" Writ took place and was compleated."

Since Mr. *Brown* has repreſented his Author as an enemy to natural as well as revealed religion: I beg leave to give one quotation more from Vol. 3. p. 224, 5. " Since
" man is ſo conſtituted by means of his ra-
" tional part as to be conſcious of his rela-
" tion to the Univerſal Syſtem and Princi-
" ple of order and intelligence; he is not
" only by nature ſociable within the limits
" of his own ſpecies: but in a yet more ge-
" nerous and extenſive manner. He is not
" only born to virtue, friendſhip, honeſty
" and faith, but to religion, piety, adora-
" tion, and a generous ſurrender of his
" mind to whatever happens from that Su-
" preame Cauſe or Order of things, which
" he acknowledges intirely juſt and per-
" fect.

" Theſe (continues his Lordſhip, ſtill
" ſpeak-

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* See Dr. *Middleton*'s Free Inquiry; where this ſentiment of his Lordſhip is well ſupported by that Ingenious Writer.

" ſpeaking of himſelf) are our Author's " formal and grave ſentiments: which, if " they were not truly his, and ſincerely " eſpouſed by him, as the real reſult of " his beſt judgment and underſtanding, he " would be guilty of a more than common " degree of impoſture. For according to " his own rule, an affected gravity, and " feigned ſerioufneſs, carried on through " any ſubject in ſuch a manner, as to leave " no inſight into the fiction or intended " raillery, is in truth no raillery or wit " at all: but a groſs, immoral, and illiberal " way of abuſe, foreign to the character " of a good writer, a gentleman, or man " of worth." ——— This admirable paſſage of the noble Author ſtrongly expreſſeth an utter abhorrence of the broken hints, the ambiguous expreſſions, the ſly inſinuations, dark innuendos and ludicro-ſerious, with which Mr. *Brown* has dared charge his Lordſhip: who thereby gives his intelligent reader a bold challenge to find any ſuch inſtances of unfairneſs in his writings. And whether he has made good his Charge, we now proceed to examine.

Sect. II. He here repreſents his Author as denying a ſtate of future puniſhment; and in confirmation of this charge, quotes

a paſſage in *Miſc.* 3. ch. 2. In which are ſeveral inſtructive and moving pieces of moral painting. I could wiſh his Lordſhip's imaginary characters in ſtate had been only imaginary, when they were drawn, and without original in real life. Having pathetically ſhewn, how common it is for men to ſin againſt their profeſſed and real principles, or judgment of their minds, through a wrong and vicious Taſte and corrupt diſpoſitions of the heart: * he obſerves that in ſuch inſtances even conſcience, or the religious argument of a future puniſhment, is likely to have but little influence. For, diſdaining to be thought like their credulous inferiors, ſuch perſons are apt to ſhew, that they look upon the pious narrations no better than children's tales, or the amuſement of the mere vulgar. This Mr. *Brown* interprets, as if his Lordſhip, while he is only deſcribing others, meant to deliver his own ſentiments. As well may he ſay, that when he deſcribes certain Suitors to power and Traffickers of in-

* This Mr. *Brown* has quoted in his 223 p. immediately after cenſuring his Lordſhip for maintaining the All-ſufficiency of the moral Taſte.

inward worth and liberty, he means to deſcribe himſelf.

Mr. *Brown* ſuppoſes, that it is with a deſign to diſprove a future puniſhment; when his Lordſhip obſerves, It is malice only and not goodneſs, that makes us afraid. But he is not then ſpeaking of the particular caſe of ſinners, but of religious men in general; who will find great ſatisfaction in the principles of true and genuine piety: and while they have right apprehenſions of God, believing him to be ſo good as to exceed the very beſt of us in goodneſs, can have no dread or ſuſpicion, (ſuch as the ſuperſtitious naturally have) to render them uneaſy: for it is malice only and not goodneſs, that can make us afraid. And thus to recommend a truly orthodox faith and ſound religion, Mr. *Brown!* is it not really becoming the philoſopher and patriot, the lover of his country and mankind?

Neither can his Lordſhip be juſtly ſuppoſed to intend any objection againſt the doctrine of future puniſhment; when he obſerves, that provocation and offence, anger and revenge are neceſſarily excluded a Being, which is perfect and univerſal.

Since perfect goodneſs, with which thoſe human weakneſſes are incompatible, will itſelf diſpoſe the Deity to puniſh vice. This obſervation indeed his Lordſhip does not make in this letter; becauſe he is writing upon another ſubject: but it is agreeable to what he has advanced elſewhere. For in his Inquiry he obſerves, which our Critic has quoted, that a man may puniſh without anger; and that vice begets a conſciouſneſs of ill deſert, both with reſpect to God and man. And again, he ſays, "The principle of *fear of future puniſhment and hope of future reward* is a "great advantage, ſecurity, and ſupport "to virtue." Let the reader compare this laſt obſervation with the 250 and 252 p. of our Critic, where he ſays, that according to Lord *Shaftſbury*'s Scheme, religious fear is ſupernumerary and uſeleſs, irrational and groundleſs. Once more; in one of his letters to a young Man at the Univerſity, his Lordſhip has theſe words; —— "'Tis "there alone, that we have need of re-"courſe to Fire and Brimſtone, and what "other puniſhments the Divine Goodneſs "(for our good) has condeſcended to threat-"en us with; where the force of thoſe "arguments, drawn from the reaſons and

"ex-

" excellence of God's laws, cannot pre-
" vail."

So that the obſervation, *It is malice only, and not goodneſs, which can make us afraid,* is plainly juſt, as it is applied by his Lordſhip to religion in general; although like all other general obſervations, it admits of an exception, and may not hold true, when applied to a particular caſe which his Lordſhip is not conſidering. It is ſurprizing therefore that it has been cenſured by that able philoſopher and divine Dr. *Butler*, under whoſe authority Mr. *Brown* (for he ſeldom ſees but with the eyes of Others) is glad to ſhelter himſelf. The Doctor might have obſerved, that his own ſentiment concerning the certainty and reaſon of divine puniſhment, is clearly and fully expreſſed in the paſſages I have juſt quoted, and many others. And I am the more ſurprized at his miſtaken and unfair cenſure on account of the good acquaintance with the noble Author, as well as the judgment, ſagacity and candour, which He elſewhere diſcovers in all his excellent writings.

Sect. III. To ſhew that his Lordſhip means to invalidate the credibility of Goſpel Hi-

Hiſtory, he in this ſection produceth a quotation from *Miſc.* 2. Ch. 2; where he ſays, that the beſt Chriſtian now in the world is but a ſceptic chriſtian. It is remarkable, that Mr. *Brown*, like an honeſt critic, has cleared this aſſertion of all difficulty by obſerving, that by ſcepticiſm his Author means any evidence, which comes ſhort of demonſtration. And it is in this ſenſe alone, that his Lordſhip calls thoſe Chriſtians, who being deſtitute of the means of certainty, depend on hiſtory and tradition for their belief, ſceptic Chriſtians. Methinks however, that he ſhews more than ſufficient reſentment for his Lordſhip's uſe of this epithet: which, if cuſtom ſo pleaſed, might well expreſs the rational foundation of a chriſtian's faith, *viz.* examination, judgment and conviction.

In his 260 p. Our Critic ſpeaks, as if his Lordſhip maintain'd, ' That human te-
' ſtimony is inſufficient to ſupport the cre-
' dibility of the ſcripture hiſtory.' Whereas there is no ſuch aſſertion in all the Characteriſticks, but frequent aſſertions there are of the contrary. Thus when he is recommending the uſe of criticiſm and free examination in religious ſubjects: His Lordſhip ſays, " It is to this Art we owe the

" re-

" recovery of letters in theſe latter ages.—
" It is to this Art, that even the ſacred
" Writers themſelves owe their higheſt
" purity and correctneſs. So ſacred ought
" the art itſelf to be eſteemed, when from
" its ſupport alone is formed that judicious
" and learned ſtrength, by which the De-
" fenders of our holy religion are able ſo
" ſucceſsfully to refute the Heathens, Jews,
" Sectarians, Heretics, and other enemies
" or oppoſers of our primitive and antient
" faith." Pleaſe to obſerve his Lordſhip's expreſſion, *primitive and antient faith:* it is not the holy myſteries of our religion. A diſtinction this, which is abſolutely neceſſary to a right underſtanding of the Characteriſticks.

Our Critic cenſures his Author's Dialogue in *Miſc.* 5. C. 3. and objects ' that ' while he pretends only to prove, that ' the ſcripture cannot be a foundation for ' uniformity of opinion in all things; he ' hath thrown out ſuch inſinuations as evi- ' dently imply that there can be no foun- ' dation for believing any thing in the Goſ- ' pel-Hiſtory.' Where do ſuch inſinuations lie? When the Sceptic or polite Scholar is objecting againſt the wild project of reconciling differences in opinion: he urges the

the difficulty of finding a ſufficient rule, that ſhall have but one interpretation; and that the rule of Scripture itſelf muſt be inſufficient to this purpoſe, 'till the whole chriſtian World are united in their ſentiments concerning the queſtion, What writings ought to be received as ſcriptural? And is this reaſoning, Mr. *Brown!* unworthy of a Chriſtian? Has any man or body of men a right to determine that queſtion for others, ſo as to oblige them to give their aſſent and conſent to his or their determination? Ought not every man on the contrary to uſe his own judgment? —— But the ſceptical Gentleman is ſo far from inſinuating the incredibility of any thing in the Goſpel-Hiſtory; that he advances not one ſentiment, which is not ſupported with the Authority of two Great Divines of our Church: — nay, he expreſsly ſays, "The "firſt holy Meſſengers, brought with them "their proper teſtimonials in their lives, "their manners and behaviour, as well as "in powerful works, miracles, and ſigns "from above." Is this, Mr. *Brown!* the language of an unbeliever?

I ſhould be ſurprized at Mr. *Brown*'s wide interpretation of the paſſage quoted in his 270 p. but that it was neceſſary in or-

order to give him an opportunity of arraigning his Author's ſagacity and good ſenſe. The paſſage itſelf is a plain declaration in favour of revelation, aſſerting " The collateral teſtimony of other antient records " to be one good argument or plea againſt " that natural ſuſpicion of vulgar ſceptics, " that the holy records themſelves were " no other, than the pure invention of an " intereſted party in behalf of their own " rich corporation."

SECT. IV. Our Critic here charges his Author with a contempt of miracles in general; which, he ſays, his Lordſhip derides in the expreſſion, *The mockery of miracles.* But this expreſſion cannot be found in all the Characteriſticks. In the *Miſc.* Mr. *Brown* refers to, his Lordſhip ſpeaks of the mockery of modern miracles, and of other pretences to miracles and inſpiration in former ages: and this he does in a plain and expreſs contradiſtinction to thoſe ſigns, prodigies, or miracles, which in the ſentence immediately preceding he acknowledges, and mentions as recorded in Holy Writ.— Error ſhould be expoſed with calmneſs, but this palpable inſtance of diſhoneſty and ſlander, Mr. *Brown!* well merits our abhorrence.

The great principle of the enemies of chriſtianity, which our Critic has given us in his 272 p. and affirms to be the foundation, which the noble Writer builds upon, is neither in ſtile nor ſentiment agreeable to his Lordſhip's elegant manner. Neither does He any where maintain, that miracles are not any proof of a revelation, as he affirms: but expreſsly aſſerts the contrary, in the paſſage Mr. *Brown* refers to; the ſubſtance of which is this: " He that is not " induced to believe in God by the con- " templation of the Univerſe, its laws and " government; will not be convinced by " any miracles: which cannot in themſelves " aſcertain the moral character of the pow- " ers, by which they are effected; nor of " courſe the true intention, the infallibility " and certainty of whatever ſuch powers " aſſert. But to whom the laws of this " univerſe and its government appear juſt: " to him they ſpeak the government of one " Juſt-One; to him they reveal and wit- " neſs a God, and laying in him the foun- " dation of this firſt faith, they fit him " for a ſubſequent one. * He can then " hearken

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* St. *John*, C. 14. v. 1. *Ye believe in God, believe alſo in me.*

" hearken to hiſtorical revelation; and is " then fitted, and not till then, for the re- " ception of any meſſage or miraculous " notice from above." Is this, Mr. *Brown!* affirming, that miracles are no proof of a revelation? But that in this paſſage we have the real ſentiment of his Lordſhip, is manifeſt, becauſe it is delivered by one of the perſonages, who ſuſtain the ſceptical or objecting part, and are allowed by his Lordſhip not to be over-tame and tractable in their diſpoſition. See Vol. 3. p. 293. ——

'Tis ſomewhat pleaſant to obſerve of Mr. *Brown*, immediately after having indulged himſelf in a fit of virulence againſt his Author, how eaſily he falls into an humble imitation of him, as far as his underſtanding and genius will permit. Thus after having inveighed againſt Him, *as ſtriking at the very baſis of all revealed religion*, partly to vent his ſpleen, and partly perhaps to hide the pious fraud; he adopts his Lordſhip's fundamental principle and reaſoning concerning miracles: " which if they be ſigns " only of power and not of goodneſs, will " not, his Lordſhip ſays, procure truſt or " credit for the powers by which they " are effected." This reflection, Mr. *Brown* even while he would diſſemble, betrays his

approbation of, by purſuing it at large; and ſhewing, 'that miraculous or ſupernatural 'effects are no otherwiſe a diſplay, proof, 'or revelation, of the Divinity, than as 'they are evidently ſubſervient to the ends 'of wiſdom and goodneſs.' Again, his Lordſhip ſays, "The Contemplation of the "Univerſe, its laws and government, is "the only means, which can eſtabliſh the "ſound belief of a Deity." Mr. *Brown* ecchoes in theſe words: 'Mankind are con-'vinced of the Being of a God, by a union 'of power, wiſdom, and goodneſs, diſ-'played in the viſible creation.' His Lord-'ſhip ſays, "He that is well-grounded in "the firſt faith, (namely the principles of "natural religion,) is fitted for the reception "of any meſſage or miraculous notice from "above;" is ready to receive any meſſage, that is confirmed by miracles. This indeed is a ſtep further, than our Critic expreſsly goes; who ſeems to pay no other regard to miracles, than to common and natural effects; and will needs ſee the actual ſubſerviency of the miraculous or ſupernatural effect to the ends of wiſdom and goodneſs, e're he will accept the meſſage: whereas his Lordſhip being convinced of a Deity, is willing to receive the meſſage barely upon the Teſtimony of the concomitant

mitant miracle; and does not ſuſpend his aſſent, till he has diſcovered the ends and uſes of the miracle, but is content with this ſimple one, *viz.* that it is wrought in confirmation of the meſſage. So that, I fear, upon examination Mr. *Brown* himſelf will prove the greater ſceptic of the Two.

His Miſrepreſentations crowded ſo thick upon me in his 272 p. that I had like to have paſſed over his aſperſion, That his Lordſhip derides our Saviour's miracles in particular, as if they were mock-miracles. When his Lordſhip obſerves, that our Saviour's miracles carry with them a certain feſtivity, alacrity, and good-humour, ſo remarkable, that he looks upon it as impoſſible not to be moved in a pleaſant manner at their recital: is this denying the reality of his miracles? Is a hiſtory the leſs credible for having ſome humorous and facetious paſſages. See *John*, ch. 2. v. 10. Does this jocular ſaying of the Governour invalidate the Evangeliſt's hiſtory? Or muſt every one, who thinks it a pleaſant ſaying, be therefore an unbeliever? Muſt a Chriſtian read without taſte, or renounce his profeſſion? Would you then, Mr. *Brown!* improve upon the Methodiſt's principle, and ſay, it is a ſin to ſmile?

SECT.

SECT. V. Our Critic's charge againſt his Author, as aſſerting, that the founders of chriſtianity were enthuſiaſts in the vulgar ſenſe of that word, is not ſupported by any expreſs quotation: which his candid reader muſt excuſe; for indeed there is no ſuch aſſertion in all his Author's writings. On the contrary, his Lordſhip condemns the objection, brought by the malicious oppoſers of early chriſtianity, who attributed the Apoſtles Gift of Tongues to the power of new wine; I ſay he condemns this objection by calling it a ſophiſtical one, which word in his Lordſhip's ſtyle always conveys a mean and contemptuous idea.

Mr. *Brown* conjectures, that his Author deſigns to deſtroy the credit of ſcripture-prophecy in his letter on Enthuſiaſm; and that He believes, or affects to believe, the ſtory of a man's ſpeaking *Latin* by the ſole force of imagination and enthuſiaſm. Surely never did an inverting glaſs ſo directly miſrepreſent objects, as our Critic's brains do his Author's meaning: which is ſolely to expoſe the prevailing ſuperſtition and enthuſiaſm of his time.

SECT. VI. Our Critic ſeems entirely to miſunderſtand his Author's notion of a religious

gious Eſtabliſhment, which is plainly this: That to the end of maintaining a public Form of Religion, it is ſufficient that the Civil Magiſtrate preſcribe and countenance one, encourage it by his own example, and invite thoſe who may aſſiſt in it with moderate offers: without injoining a conformity to it under ſevere penalties, or any way violating the rights of private judgment. And this ſentiment was very proper to pacify thoſe warm and jealous friends of the Conſtitution as they pretended: who moved for violent meaſures againſt Diſſenters; and with the firebrand of that faſhionable Cry, The Church is in danger! would have ſet the nation in flames. And his Lordſhip's opinion is verified in the experience of theſe happy times: as will appear to any one, who compares the State of the diſſenting intereſt in former times of perſecution, with the State of it under the preſent mild and tolerating Government. We have found that the moderation and voluntary indulgence of the executive Powers has heightened that ſociable and complying ſpirit, which his Lordſhip repreſents, by the ſtory of his travelling Friends, to be naturally prevailing as well in religious as in other matters: and that it has been very aſſiſting to many ſenſible Men, in their endeavours to reconcile them-

themſelves to ſeveral untoward conditions of their admittance into the eſtabliſhed Church: ſuch Men, I am ſpeaking of, as from a certain eaſineſs of temper are won by a gentle invitation; but being ſincerely in the intereſt of Liberty, would nevertheleſs in all probability have ſhewn a different ſpirit, had they been compelled with an air of ſeverity and force.

Mr. *Brown*'s next charge againſt his Author, is, That he repreſents Chriſtianity as of an unſociable temper. But when his Lordſhip in his Letter on Enthuſiaſm condemns "that new ſort of policy, which "out of a ſupernatural charity has taught "us the way of plaguing one another moſt "devoutly; and the project of uniformity "of opinion, which is become the chief "care of the magiſtrate:" What a ſtupid or perverſe Reader muſt that be, who either ignorantly or knowingly calls this an intended aſperſion upon Chriſtianity; which, his Lordſhip expreſsly ſays, obliges us to ſhew benevolence and charity towards all men, and in particular towards our fellow-chriſtians, our neighbours and kindred of whatever degree.

In his 321 page our Critic charges his Author

thor with a contradiction within the compaſs of ten lines: let him read the paſſage again, and he will find the miſtake to be his own.

As to that paſſage in the Soliloquy, quoted in Mr. *Brown*'s 323 pag. there is no neceſſity for ſuppoſing that his Lordſhip intended to throw any ſuſpicion upon our holy religion, as it is in the Goſpel. I am perſuaded, he meant to expoſe the prevailing inaccuracy and negligence of thoſe in his time; whoſe duty it was to correct and purify the notions of mankind, concerning their beſt ſelf-intereſt, and the happineſs of heaven. There is indeed a propriety and addreſs in repreſenting heaven by common and ſenſible alluſions. For what ſo likely to gain the attention of the miſer, as the ſound of riches? What ſo likely to enflame the heart of the ambitious, as a crown and kingdom; or that of the epicure, as exquiſite and over-flowing pleaſures? But when by this honeſt art of condeſcenſion, they have once gained the ear of ſuch perſons, they ought gradually to undeceive them, and rectify their notions and deſires of happineſs, in imitation of the holy and inſpired Preachers: who, on purpoſe, to prevent our miſconſtruction, have interwoven ſuch circum-

ſtances with their alluſions, as plainly diſtinguiſh heavenly enjoyments from groſs and meaner things, and ſpecify their ſpiritual nature. Thus the treaſures in heaven are ſuch as moth and ruſt doth not corrupt, and thieves cannot break through and ſteal. The prize, we are encouraged to ſtrive for, is ſure to all and incorruptible. And the pleaſures of heaven are eternal, and ſpiritually diſcerned; diſcerned by thoſe only, who are ſpiritually inclined, and are poſſeſſed of good and virtuous diſpoſitions.—— That theſe are the Sentiments of his Lordſhip, is evident from many paſſages, I have had occaſion already to quote from his Characteriſticks; and will be more ſo to any one, who reads his preface to Dr. *Whitchcot*'s Sermons. For his Lordſhip there recommends it to the public inſtructors of mankind, to convince them of an happineſs in virtue, and of the purity of the reward in heaven, which is not different in ſort or kind, but chiefly in degree, from that immediate happineſs. Speaking of chriſtianity, his Lordſhip ſays, It is a religion, where love is chiefly enjoined; where the heart is expreſsly called for; and the outward action without that is diſregarded; where charity or kindneſs is made all in all. Then He cenſures thoſe, who ſo explain the future

future reward as to degrade the principle of good nature, and hereby exclude all worthy and generous diſpoſitions, all that love and charity and affection, which the ſcripture enjoins; and without which no action is lovely in the ſight of God or man, or in itſelf deſerving of notice or kind reward.

Our Critic cenſures his Author's Obſervation in Vol. I. p. 99 and 100, *viz.* That the virtues of private friendſhip and love of our country, are not particularly enjoined in the Goſpel, nor expreſsly enforced by any poſitive rewards. But this obſervation is not expreſly delivered for an objection againſt Chriſtianity: and ought not to be underſtood as one, nor as any inſinuation againſt it, any more in Lord *Shaftſbury*, than in our Learned Biſhop *Taylor*, or any other of our Chriſtian Divines, who have made the ſame obſervation: Eſpecially ſince his Lordſhip obſerves further by way of apology for chriſtianity, that whatever rewards are reſerved for thoſe virtues are *happily concealed at preſent*. And in what follows, his Lordſhip ſeems, not to deride the Goſpel, but to rally thoſe miſtaken and narrow Chriſtians of his time, who by a miſapplication of ſcripture thought to diſengage themſelves

from the obligation of friendſhip and public ſpiritedneſs. See our 48 page at the bottom.

Sect. VII. As to the retreat of the *Iſraelites* from *Egypt*, his Lordſhip obſerves, That it can ſcarce be ſaid in reality, from what appears in holy writ, that it was voluntary; and that the hiſtorians of other nations have preſum'd to aſſert, that they were expelled on account of their leproſy. With what reaſon can it be ſaid, that his Lordſhip here prefers the hiſtory of *Tacitus* and *Juſtin* to that of *Moſes*; when he only mentions their account in a point, which his Lordſhip thought that *Moſes* had not clearly determin'd.

In his 350 page, Mr. *Brown* ſeems not to underſtand his Author's meaning, in his reference to St. *Luke*'s Preface, which I apprehended to be, that his Words, (εδοξε καμοι παρηκολυθηκοτι ανωθεν πασιν ακριβως) intimate, that it was wholly of his own motion, and not by any ſupernatural impulſe, when he undertook to write his hiſtory: and that he wrote according to his own natural judgment.

In

In his 351 Page, Mr. *Brown* intimates, that his Author denies the inſpiration of *Joſeph*, and the divine authority of the Moſaic Diſpenſation. But the cenſure is without foundation: For his Lordſhip only obſerves, that *Joſeph* gain'd *Pharaoh*'s favour, by outdoing the *Egyptians* in the interpretation of dreams. But as to the power, by which he did ſo, whether it was natural or ſupernatural, he is intirely ſilent.

And in the obſervations, which he makes at the concluſion of his Advice to an Author, concerning the conduct of the *Jewiſh* Leaders and People towards the *Canaanites*; his Lordſhip does not call in queſtion God's authority, who undoubtedly has a right to commiſſion, whom he pleaſes, to execute his judgments: And He is only conſidering, what worth and merit the *Jews* therein diſcover'd; which, He obſerves, was not ſuch as naturally excites our eſteem and admiration. And it muſt be owned, that the merit of a legal executioner is not uſed to be highly rated.

In the 3d Chapter of his Lordſhip's 2d miſcellany is illuſtrated this propoſition; that moderation or an indulgence given to the wit and

and humour of men by allowing them a free inquiry into things, is corroborative of religion, and promotive of true Faith; ſuch as the magiſtrate eſpouſes or countenances; and that if any thing be more availing to this purpoſe than a perfect moderation, it muſt be a thorough Perſecution; which contrary methods are incompatible, and if blended together, would mutually defeat each other's intentions.——And His muſt be a random head indeed, who cannot ſee this to be the deſign and meaning of his Lordſhip, in the firſt part of the Chapter, and particularly in the Story of the travelling Friends; which, ſince Mr. *Brown* judiciouſly calls a Farce, if it be not too much trouble, let himſelf explain, who are the *Dramatis Perſonæ*.

The noble Author has obſerved, "That "affection and love, which procures a true "adherence to a new religious foundation, "muſt depend either upon a real or coun- "terfeit goodneſs in the religious Founder. "Whatever ambitious ſpirit may inſpire "him; whatever ſavage zeal, or perſecuting "principle may lie in reſerve, ready to diſ- "cloſe itſelf, when authority and power is "once obtained, *&c.*" This our Critic's ſagacity ſuſpects to be an inſinuated charge againſt our Saviour. But his Lordſhip is there

there expreſsly ſpeaking of the common practice and artifice of many ſects: Out of whoſe charity and brotherly love come ſteel, fire, gibbets, rods, *&c.* This arbitrary and forced miſapplication of yours, Mr. *Brown!* is one inſtance among many others, already expoſed, of flagrant calumny and injuſtice, which nothing can excuſe.

As to *David*'s dancing before the ark, the noble Author, before he mentions it, obſerves; "That if the *Jewiſh* Princes acted "in reality according to the inſtitutions of "their great Founder; not only muſick, "but even play and dance were of holy ap-"pointment and divine right." I wonder that Dr. *Leland*, in his quotation of this paſſage, ſhould omit the conditional part of it; and thereby give it a quite different turn. Take the paſſage, as it lies; and his Lordſhip ſeems to intimate his opinion, that they did not therein act according to the inſtitutions of their great Founder: And this is ſufficient to clear him from the imputation of deſpiſing the Diſpenſation itſelf of *Moſes*. If his Lordſhip has made a miſtake in his repreſentation of *David*'s dancing; it is certainly ſuch a one as a writer might fall into, without any great prejudice. And it is well, that the learned

learned Doctor has ſet the affair in ſuch a religious light.

Neither ought the noble Author to be charged with deſigning to expoſe the ſpirit of prophecy in general; when he intimates his ſuſpicion, that the prophefying ſpirit, he there mentions, had nothing of a ſupernatural influence: Since the Doctor himſelf explains it in the ſenſe only of praiſe and thankfulneſs.

As to his Lordſhip's repreſentation of the ſtory of the Prophet *Jonah*: I do not find that his expreſſions, low as they may ſeem, are at all beneath the ideas that *Jonah* appears to have had of God: And if he meant to intimate, that ſome paſſages in his hiſtory, and ſeveral other parts of ſcripture, are to be parabolically underſtood; He has the concurrence of Mr. *Brown*'s own Opinion.

Since our Critic cenſures his Author's ſentiments concerning certain myſteries of religion: he ought to have been more definitive and intelligible upon this ſubject. He ought to have inquired, what his Lordſhip calls myſteries: by which he does not mean thoſe ways of providence, the reaſon and ultimate deſign of which are indeed myſterious and hidden

hidden from us; but ſuch abſtruſe doctrines, as are ſpecified in Vol. II. pag. 359. One might have expected Mr. *Brown* to explain theſe doctrines, ſo far at leaſt as to ſhew that they are not contrary to reaſon. But it ſeems he prudently choſe to decline the arduous taſk: He choſe rather to flouriſh and brandiſh in the air, than enter into cloſe fight with reaſon and common ſenſe. Perhaps he was jealous, as indeed he had cauſe to be jealous, of a certain inconſiſtency in thoſe wonderfully ſublime and inexplicable myſteries with the pure ſimplicity; which he afterwards juſtly celebrates as a great excellence in the ſacred Writings.

SECT. VIII. As to this ſection, I have prevented myſelf, and obviated Mr. *Brown*'s charge againſt his Lordſhip, as condemning and diſcarding the compoſition and ſimple ſtile and manner of the holy Scriptures: and ſhall only obſerve, that he ſpeaks with reſpect of thoſe " ſhort and ſummary precepts and " divine laws, delivered to us in poſitive " commands from our Sacred Legiſlator. " 'Tis our buſineſs, (continues his Lordſhip " in one of his Letters to a Young Man), " and of all, as many as are raiſed in know- " ledge above the poor illiterate and laborious " vulgar, to explain as far as poſſible, the

" reaſons of thoſe laws; their conſent with
" the law of nature, their ſuitableneſs to So-
" ciety, and to the peace, happineſs and en-
" joyment of ourſelves." *

SECT. IX. I ſhall only add upon this laſt Section of Mr. *Brown*, that his charge againſt his Author, as ſpeaking contemptuouſly and bitterly againſt the miniſters of the Goſpel, and particularly the *Engliſh* Clergy, *is unfair and groundleſs. 'Tis true indeed that he complains of the* " far greater part and numbers
" of that Body of Clergy called the Church
" of *England*, who no more eſteem them-
" ſelves a Proteſtant Church, or in union
" with thoſe of Proteſtant Communion; tho'
" they pretend to the name of Chriſtian, and
" would have us judge of the ſpirit of Chri-
" ſtianity from theirs: which God prevent!
" leſt good men ſhould in time forſake Chri-
" ſtianity through their means." And was there not in his Lordſhip's time occaſion for this complaint? Could He ſpeak too meanly of thoſe, who being employed by the Public to officiate in holy things, were given up to voluptuouſneſs and indolence, who degraded

* Does his Lordſhip appear Mr. *Brown!* to have an extreme contempt of the Vulgar, or be unconcern'd for their welfare?

graded learning, discouraged all rational inquiry and freedom of thought, and zealously preached up the treasonable doctrine of passive-obedience and non-resistance; who affected an independency upon the State; and sought to awe, enslave and prey upon mankind by their daring and presumptuous pretensions to a dread authority, over some, by flattering others with unwarranted assurances of grace and favour from above, and all the arts, that are proper to win or force the superstitious, into an implicit and intire submission to priestly power? But in condemning these men, did his Lordship reflect upon the whole Body of the Clergy? No, Mr. *Brown!* be not so false to your fraternity, as to assert it. His Lordship frequently speaks well of your Order, and the institution of preaching: and in very emphatical terms in his Preface to Dr. *Whitchcot*'s Sermons. And in all his Writings makes honourable and respectful mention of our *Tillotsons*, our *Barrows*, our *Chillingworths*, our *Hammonds*.

To conclude, we see from Mr. *Brown*'s continually false quotations, misconstructions, and pretended insinuations of the noble Author, that in his great piety, he has not scrupled to employ false witnesses, racks and tortures, and all the other arts of an holy inquisitor

ther against a criminal, whom he is determined to pronounce guilty. And we see also, that the writings of Lord *Shaftsbury*, which, if this inquisitor-advocate for religion had power equal to his zeal and ignorance, might probably be burnt by the hands of the common hangman; (for what less could be expected from his flaming peroration? which, without the least regard to decency or justice, breathes such senseless fury against the shade and immortally glorious memory of the noble Author:) I say, these inimitable writings, upon a just and accurate examination, appear elegantly to illustrate, and establish upon the best foundations, the great principles of Truth and Freedom, Virtue and Religion both Natural and Revealed, as well as to give the judicious reader an universal Taste for what is truly excellent in all the ingenious Arts and Sciences.

FINIS.